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The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and
Its Future Predicted
Ronald Jay Allen and M. Kristin Mace

Abstract

Like many areas of the law, the Fifth Amendment has defied theoretical explanation by scholars. We examine whether the fifth amendment cases can be explained
with a relatively simple theory, and find that they can. The key to that theory is
the recognition that, although never acknowledged by the Court, its cases make
plain that “testimony” is the substantive content of cognition - the propositions
with truth-value that people hold or generate (as distinct from the ability to hold
or generate propositions with truth-value). This observation leads to a comprehensive positive theory of the Fifth Amendment right: the government may not
compel disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of cognition that themselves (the substantive results) are the product of state action. As we demonstrate
in this article, this theory explains all of the cases, a feat not accomplished under
any other scholarly or judicial theory; it even explains the most obvious datum
that might be advanced against it - the sixth birthday question in Muniz. There
remain two sources of ambiguity in Fifth Amendment adjudications. First, compulsion and incrimination are both continuous variables - questions of degree. The
Court has recognized this and set about defining the amount of compulsion and
incrimination necessary to a Fifth Amendment violation. The result is a common
law of both topics rather than a precise metric of either. These two variables are
independent and do not interact, which reduces the complexity of decision making. Compulsion, in other words, is in no way determined by the extent to which
the results are incriminating. Compulsion is determined on its own, as is the sufficiency of incrimination. The second source of ambiguity arises from the Court
not explicitly equating ”testimony” with cognition, though that is precisely what
has controlled its decisions. Given that the Court’s opinions have not focused on
substantive cognition as the third element of a Fifth Amendment violation, it is

not surprising that the Court has not clarified whether cognition, too, is a continuous or discontinuous variable. This is where the future lies. The Court will
have to clarify two matters: first, whether the extent of cognition matters, and second, the derivative consequences of cognition. In addition, the Court will have to
determine whether these two issues are, like compulsion and incrimination, independent. Does the extensiveness of the compelled cognition determine how far its
causal effect will be traced? We then note that this ”theory” does not look like a
standard academic theory with its attendant emphasis on normative analysis. We
examine whether the normal meaning of ”normative justification” is a very useful
one in any field of law with the range of the fifth amendment, point out that it is
quite similar to the fourth amendment in this regard, and that scholarly efforts to
discover its ”true” justification may be doomed to failure. This does not mean that
fields of law are unjustified, but perhaps that the justification must come in other
terms. The terms plainly applicable to these two areas are the traditional ones
of the rule of law. The Court has strived to make sense of ambiguous directives
through creating and sustaining relatively clear legal categories and by responding
to new situations through analogies to prior cases. We think it plausible that, however dull this may appear to the legal theorist, the legal system may be better off
as a result. The article thus adds to the growing literature concerning the nature
of legal theorizing by demonstrating yet another area where legal theorizing in its
modern conventional sense (involving the search for the moral or philosophical
theory that justifies an area of law) has been completely ineffectual, whereas explanations that are informed by the presently neglected values of legality (clarity,
precision, consistency, fidelity to authority) have considerable promise.

The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted
Ronald J. Allen*
M. Kristin Mace**
Constitutional theorizing is a tricky business. The document is ancient, contains many
provision directed toward discrete problems that have little modern salience, and frequently
contains vague and capacious language that defies straightforward theoretical development. On
occasion, as with the Fourth Amendment, all three symptoms may be present, making theorizing
a largely futile endeavor.1 The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment suffers from
at least two of these three problems. It is certainly ancient and was written to eliminate specific
abuses of authority that have no close modern analogues;2 indeed, the most unproblematic
application of the right against self-incrimination today is to custodial interrogation by the police,
a practice that did not even exist when the Fifth Amendment was ratified.3 Even though the
language of the Fifth Amendment (which henceforth we use interchangeably with “SelfIncrimination Clause”) is more constraining than that of the Fourth, given the evolution of the
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See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of
Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683 (2002); Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149
(1998).
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Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31,
36 (1982) (citing as examples of the “ambiguous and sometimes contradictory picture of the reasons underlying the
fifth amendment’s enactment” provided by traditional historical sources: LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); and Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935)). See also R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 181 (1997).
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practical significance of the Fifth Amendment, perhaps it is not surprising that the theoretical
foundations of the Fifth Amendment are conventionally thought to be in disarray. The Supreme
Court’s effort to explain it contains stirring rhetoric that may move the heart but leave the
intellect unconvinced. According to the Court:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. 4
The “fundamental values” enumerated in the quoted passage are striking in their vacuity
and circularity. To take just a few examples: an innocent person faces no trilemma; there is no
simple dichotomy between accusatorial and inquisitorial regimes; never has the government had
to “shoulder the entire load”; far from “human personality” being “inviolable,” law molds and
shapes “human personality” directly, constantly and unavoidably; and immunity permits the
most private aspects of a person’s life to be divulged, as occurs in civil cases daily across the
land. These observations are not new.5 Even Justice Goldberg, the author of the paragraph,
observed that the Self-Incrimination Clause is “regarded as so fundamental a part of our

4

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (internal quotations omitted), quoted in Arenella, supra
note xx, at 36-37 (1982).
5
Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COL. L.
REV. 989, 1017 n. 51 (1996) (stating that these justifications were “basically dismantled” by Henry J. Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968), and Arenella,
supra note xx). See also Alschuler, supra note xx, at 200 (1997) (“More than the adaptation of old doctrines to new
functions, the history of the privilege against self-incrimination seem to reveal the tyranny of slogans. Shorthand
phrases have taken on lives of their own. These phrases have eclipsed the goals of the doctrines that they purported
to describe and even the texts that embodied these doctrines.”).
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constitutional fabric, despite the fact that ‘the law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their
minds just what it is supposed to do or just whom it is intended to protect.’”6
This conceptual ambiguity has not escaped scholars and has led to a proliferation of
scholarly emendations to the Court’s explanations that uniformly fail to convince.7 Amar and
Lettow wrote, “[t]he Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of
vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights.”8 William Stuntz summed it
up: “It is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the
privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”9
But there is an ambiguity in the word “theory” threaded through the various judicial and
scholarly treatments of the Fifth Amendment. It sometimes is used to refer to the justification of
a practice, which is the sense in which Justice Goldberg was theorizing. At other times it is used
to predict or prescribe the scope or limitations of governmental power on the one hand, or
privacy, autonomy, or dignity interests of citizens on the other.

Some of the theoretical

difficulties infecting the Fifth Amendment may result from failing to sort out these different
perspectives. To be sure, one reasonably may think that the theoretical justification for a practice
must constrain its scope. Interestingly, the Fifth Amendment offers a counter-example to such a
belief, which is the main burden of this article. While its justification is, we agree, hopelessly
muddled, the scope of the Fifth Amendment (its implications in the real world for
government/citizen interactions) can be specified quite clearly. In other words, while there is no
6

Murphy, 378 U.S. at 56 n.5 (quoting Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment—Some Legal and Impractical
Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC SCI. 181, 182 (1953)), quoted in Michael Edmund O’Neill, The Fifth Amendment
in Congress: Revisiting the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L. J. 2445, 2445-46 (2002).
7
Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, supra note xx, at 1015-23.
8
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment, First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93
MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995), quoted in O’Neill, supra note xx, at 2466.
9
William J. Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988). See also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6, 6-10 (1986) (discussing the lack of an accepted theory), cited in Stuntz, supra, at 1228 n.1; Schulhofer,
supra note xx, at 311 (“The Self-Incrimination Clause is probably our most schizophrenic amendment.”).

3
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

general theoretical justification for the Fifth Amendment, there is a powerfully explanatory
positive theory. Moreover, we can specify precisely where ambiguity remains, and the possible
directions that future developments might take—indeed, must take, given what the Court has
done to date. It is unclear which path the Court may choose, but it is apparent which paths will
remain open. In this respect, the Court’s treatment of the Self-Incrimination Clause may mirror
its treatment of the Fourth Amendment.10 Both may defy general justificatory theories, yet both
lead to relatively predictable results. This, in turn, may have implications for the nature and
utility of some forms of legal scholarship, a point we return to at the conclusion of this article.
Although discussion of abstract values can still be found occasionally in its opinions,11
the Supreme Court has shifted to a formal approach to the Fifth Amendment.12 The SelfIncrimination Clause states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”13

Under what Lance Cole described as “Fisher’s new textualist

analytical approach,”14 the Court has concluded that Fifth Amendment violations must contain
three elements: compulsion, incrimination, and testimony.15 Testimony, however, has never
been clearly defined and is the source of the remaining unpredictability in the future of the Fifth
Amendment. Although never acknowledged by the Court, its cases make plain that “testimony”

10

See Allen & Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory, supra note xx.
See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690-98 (1998) (analyzing the “catalog of ‘Policies of the
Privilege’” in Murphy).
12
For a more detailed discussions of the evolution of Fifth Amendment theory, see William J. Stuntz, The
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L. J. 393 (1995); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1986); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); and Amar & Lettow, supra note xx.
13
U.S. CONST., amend. V.
14
Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents After United States v.
Hubbell – New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 142-43 (2002) (explaining that in Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1976), the Court “rejected both property rights and personal privacy as
rationales for protection against self-incrimination; instead, it looked to the text of the Fifth Amendment and focused
on the compulsion of ‘testimonial’ communications as the touchstone for self-incrimination analysis.”).
15
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the
accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
11
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is the substantive content of cognition—the propositions with truth-value that people hold or
generate (as distinct from the ability to hold or generate propositions with truth-value).16
This observation leads to a comprehensive positive theory of the Fifth Amendment right:
the government may not compel disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of cognition
that themselves (the substantive results) are the product of state action. As we demonstrate in
this article, this theory explains all of the cases, a feat not accomplished under any other
scholarly or judicial theory. As we develop below, it even explains the most obvious datum that
might be advanced against it—the sixth birthday question in Muniz.17
As we also elaborate below, there remain two sources of ambiguity in Fifth Amendment
adjudications. First, compulsion and incrimination are both continuous variables—questions of
degree. The Court has recognized this and set about defining the amount of compulsion and
incrimination necessary to a Fifth Amendment violation. The result is a common law of both
topics rather than a precise metric of either. These two variables are independent and do not
interact, which reduces the complexity of decision making. Compulsion, in other words, is in no
way determined by the extent to which the results are incriminating. Compulsion is determined
on its own, as is the sufficiency of incrimination.
The second source of ambiguity arises from the Court not explicitly equating “testimony”
with cognition, though that is precisely what has controlled its decisions. Given that the Court’s
16

We use the term “propositions with truth-value” as it is used in deductive logic, meaning all propositions that in
every possible world must be either true or not true. An individual’s propositional statement of a belief has truthvalue even if it turns out to be false.
“Cognition” is discussed in Part I.D. where we define the term to include the intellectual processes of
acquiring, storing, retrieving, and using knowledge. “Cognition” is used herein to refer to these intellectual
processes that allow one to gain and make use of substantive knowledge and to compare one’s “inner world”
(previous knowledge) with the “outside world” (stimuli such as questions from an interrogator). Excluded are
simple psychological responses to stimuli such as fear, warmness, and hunger; the mental processes that produce
muscular movements; and one’s will or faculty for choice. See infra pp. xx-xx. See also MARGARET W. MATLIN,
COGNITION 2, 26 (3d ed. 1994).
17
See infra pp. xx-xx for a discussion of Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990), where the Court
considered whether the Fifth Amendment was implicated by the question, posed to a suspect by police officers, “Do
you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?”
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opinions have not focused on substantive cognition as the third element of a Fifth Amendment
violation, it is not surprising that the Court has not clarified whether cognition, too, is a
continuous or discontinuous variable. This is where the future lies. The Court will have to
clarify two matters: first, whether the extent of cognition matters, and second, the derivative
consequences of cognition. In addition, the Court will have to determine whether these two
issues are, like compulsion and incrimination, independent. Does the extensiveness of the
compelled cognition determine how far its causal effect will be traced?
Part I presents our positive theory of the Fifth Amendment through an examination of the
three variables that constitute it. Of course, a positive theory is not normative or justificatory,
and to be clear, we largely leave such inquiry to others. In Part II, we elaborate on the ambiguity
introduced into Fifth Amendment adjudications by the Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Hubbell.18 We show that in Hubbell the Court veered sharply from the apparent course set by
Fisher v. United States,19 by recognizing a dramatically different role for cognition and its
consequences. In Fisher, though compelled cognition itself was protected, law enforcement had
ready access to the incriminating information derived from it. In Hubbell, by inflating derivative
use immunity to previously unseen proportions, the Court expanded the scope of protection.
After Hubbell, there are three possibilities for the future of the privilege against selfincrimination, which Part III explores: 1) the Court will view Hubbell as a mere bump in the
road past which the Fisher line of cases will continue, ultimately ignoring the new approach with
which Hubbell flirted; 2) Hubbell will be followed to its natural end in an expansive derivative
use doctrine triggered by any compelled cognition; or 3) the Court will constrain derivative use
and develop Hubbell’s concept of “extensive” use of a suspect’s cognition in a common-law

18
19

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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manner to create a workable distinction between Hubbell and Fisher. As we will show, it is
likely the relationship between these two cases that will determine the future of the Fifth
Amendment.

I.

Compulsion, Incrimination, and Cognition
Law enforcement officers ask John Doe to consent to a lie detector test but
Doe refuses, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The
officers try to physically restrain him, but he resists. Eventually, they strap Doe
to a gurney and attach a polygraph machine. The tester begins to ask questions.
He first asks Doe easy questions like his name, age, and address. The officers
already have this information but they want to establish his baseline, normal
response. Doe refuses to answer even these simple questions and sits silently.
Though the tester is not able to elicit any oral responses, he records Doe’s
physiological responses to the questions.
After working through his script of introductory questions, the tester
moves on to questions about Doe’s participation in a crime. Doe remains silent,
but the tester continues to record the changes in his heart rate, blood pressure,
breathing, and electrodermal responses (electrical conductance at the skin
level).20 The questions become more and more specific but Doe never speaks; in
fact, he does his best not to communicate anything at all to the tester.
At one point, the tester asks about the victim of the crime they are
investigating. The officers know that a little girl was abducted from a YMCA in
Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve. An eyewitness described someone who
looked like Doe and the officers arrested him pursuant to a warrant. Now they
urgently want to find the little girl. The officers have provided the tester with
maps of a twenty-mile area around the YMCA. The tester divides the map with a
grid and tries to elicit from Doe the location of the little girl. Systematically,
starting with large quadrants and narrowing to a smaller area, the tester points
to each section of the map. Still, Doe remains silent and the tester records his
physiological responses. By continuing this process, the tester is able to narrow
in and find a very specific location that causes Doe to respond dramatically: his
heart races and his breathing quickens. The officers search this location and find
the body of the little girl.
Later, the State admits the polygraph test results at Doe’s trial for
abduction and murder. In his testimony, the tester reads each question that he
asked Doe and describes Doe’s physiological responses. He shows the jury how
he systematically pointed to each area of the map and describes how he was able

20

These are some of the physiological responses currently analyzed in polygraph tests. See BOARD ON
BEHAVIORAL, COGNITIVE, AND SENSORY SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS, THE
POLYGRAPH
AND
LIE
DETECTION
12-13
(2003)
(available
at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/12.html#pagetop).
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to elicit from Doe enough information to lead the officers to the body. The jury
convicts.21
The implications of this hypothetical have bedeviled analysis of the Fifth Amendment.
There is perhaps universal agreement that the actions of the officers violate the Fifth
Amendment, but why? There is certainly compulsion and incrimination, but where is the
testimony?22 The lack of a clear answer feeds the sense that there is a conceptual hole at the
middle of the Fifth Amendment. Though testimony is a necessary ingredient of a Fifth
Amendment violation and is absent from this hypothetical, the universal intuition is that
involuntary polygraphs violates the Constitution.23 The answer to this puzzle is that “testimony”
means the substantive results of cognition. It is the failure to recognize that “testimony” reduces
to cognition that has left Justices and theorists unable to explain the hypothetical, and more
importantly, unable to construct a coherent explanation of the cases. We discuss compulsion,
incrimination, and testimony, each in turn. The first two are handled more briefly because they
present no real theoretical problems. Testimony as cognition, the contribution and lynchpin of
our argument, is discussed in more detail. The section closes with a comprehensive theory of the
privilege that explains all of the cases.

A.

Compulsion

21

The facts in this hypothetical loosely resemble those in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). There,
however, the officers used a map and grid to conduct their own search of the area. Mr. Williams told the police
where to find the little girl’s body in response to what has become known as the “Christian burial speech.” A
polygraph test was not administered.
22
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled
production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a
Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
23
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (“To compel a person to submit to testing in which an
effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or
not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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The test for compulsion under the Fifth Amendment is “whether, considering the totality
of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”24 Most of the difficulty with
determining compulsion is a direct consequence of the free will/determinism problem at the
center of this definition.25 If free will does not exist, the most plausible position,26 then the test is
conceptually and functionally bankrupt. If it does exist, then either all choices are exercises of
free will (a person can always choose to endure more torture), leaving the test inconsequential if
not bankrupt, or there is no method to distinguish whether a particular act is a result of free will
or of free will being overborne. How would we ever know, for instance, if a particular person
being subjected to torture could have held out but confessed because of the rising tide of guilt
washing over him? And how would we know whether the mildest threat, like the risk of a short
jail sentence, actually overbore the will of a weak-willed individual?
Although some of the rhetoric of the Supreme Court, and that of some commentators,
remains fascinated with, or stuck in, the free will/determinism debate,27 the results of the cases
are explainable in other terms, indicating that the Fifth Amendment does not require an answer to
the problem. Free will, despite the assertions of some,28 is not a necessary predicate for criminal

24

United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
For a very basic explanation of the free will/determinism debate see SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 102-03, 147 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (1994).
26
If an act is constrained by the reasons for the act, the act is not free. If these reasons exist because of other
reasons, an infinite regress ensues. “Free will” would have to be composed of, or derived from, reasons held for no
reason at all, which, while “free” in one sense, eliminates rationality. If “free will” means random or capricious
starting points, it does not seem to be worthy of respect. But, any alternative to randomness or capriciousness that
preserves rationality rules out free will.
27
See, e.g., George C. Thomas III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243 (1991).
28
See id. at 243-44 (“The criminal law follows Plato and Aristotle by presupposing that members of society are
autonomous actors who can be punished for choosing to act in certain ways.”) (citing R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO
SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927) (“noting that criminal law historically “postulates a free agent confronted
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong”); 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *20-21 (“the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in
question, being the only thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable.”)).
25
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law generally, or for the right against compelled self-incrimination specifically.29 For Fifth
Amendment compulsion, as in many areas of the law, the Court has employed an objective test
that focuses on governmental action rather than individuals’ responses.

This converts the

meaningless or intractable question of free will into a demarcation of how much pressure is too
much to exceed the threshold for the compulsion necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation.30
The location of the demarcation, however, remains a question.

What sorts of

governmental actions that result in disclosure of self-incriminating testimony are prohibited by
the Constitution? The answer emerges from the Court’s assessments of social conventions
concerning threats and promises that are factually bound and developed in a traditional commonlaw manner. One such convention is that physical force is inappropriate.31 Therefore, the
administration of John Doe’s polygraph involved compulsion. If there is any “testimony” in
Doe’s hypothetical case, it was obtained by physically restraining him and subjecting him to
unwanted touching.

29

Jeremy Bentham, for instance, was a determinist in addition to being very interested in jurisprudence and hopeful
that a code of laws could be established that would make men conform to the public interest. See BERTRAND
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 775 (1945). Determinism should not be confused with fatalism
which may be more incongruous with a system of criminal law. See SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF PHILOSOPHY 137 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (1994) (Fatalism is “[t]he doctrine that human action has no
influence on events. . . . Fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implication that
human action is ineffectual.”). See also Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The
True Impact of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L. J. 1031 (2003) (arguing that, though scientific evidence of
genetic and societal influences on behavioral traits may undermine the theory of individual free will, the American
criminal justice system need not be altered dramatically, but rather simply must rely more heavily on utilitarian
rationales).
30
See Arenella, supra note xx at 39 (“Ultimately, what is at issue here is a normative question: the extent to which
an individual can be forced to participate in his own self-condemnation. Its resolution requires the Court to balance
conflicting concerns of fairness to the accused against the state’s legitimate need to secure reliable information of
wrongdoing.”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 866
(1979) (arguing that “normative judgments about various degrees of impairment of mental freedom” are required),
cited in Thomas & Bilder, supra note xx, at 266 n.125. To be clear, we take no position on whether the Court’s
practice is itself normatively desirable; rather, we are simply engaging in factual exegesis.
31
See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (“The longstanding common-law principle, nemo tenetur
seipsum prodere, was thought to ban only testimony forced by compulsory oath or physical torture . . .”); South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (“[T]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited
to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.”) (citing
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)).

10
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art18

Through a standard common-law approach, the Court has placed various kinds of
compulsion along a continuum, producing a list of acceptable and unacceptable governmental
actions. Examples abound; indeed, they define the constitutional conception of compulsion for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. A defendant may be made to allocute when entering a guilty
plea.32 The government can place burdens on an individual’s out-of-court choice whether to
invoke the privilege.33 There is no “impermissible coercion” where the defendant is not involved
in the production of information,34 or takes an action contrary to what the state wants him to

32

Though this has sometimes been described as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right, LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §21.5(f) (3d ed. 2000), it is more accurate to recognize it as a simple absence of compulsion because a
court may only accept guilty pleas that are “voluntary.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central
to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court
that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded
by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so—hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the
voluntary expression of his own choice.”). A valid plea colloquy cannot violate the right against self-incrimination
because the defendant has, by definition, freely chosen to plead guilty. Federal courts enforce this through Rule
11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which states, “courts shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary
and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d) (2000).
33
See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (“respondent’s choice is marked less by compulsion than by
choices the Court has held give no rise to a self-incrimination claim. The ‘criminal process, like the rest of the legal
system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow.
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses,
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.’ It is well settled that the government
need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.”) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 213 (1971)). See also Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (finding no violation
where an adverse inference is drawn from an individual’s refusal to answer questions before a clemency board);
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (concluding that the state’s impeachment use of the defendant’s pre-arrest
silence did not constitute an undue burden on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment rights); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357 (1978) (upholding the validity of imposing serious burdens on the defendant’s exercise of his privilege
in the plea-bargaining context); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 947 (1976) (permitting adverse inference from the
refusal to testify in a prison disciplinary hearing); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that application
of the Florida notice-of-alibi rule did not compel the defendant to be a witness against himself); Amar & Lettow,
supra note xx, at 868 (arguing that “outside the courtroom, the ‘no worse off’ test seems extravagant and
unworkable: the logical consequences are absurd.”). But see Uniform Sanitation Men Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Sanitation of City of New York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (loss of employment as a penalty is capable of coercing
incriminating testimony); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (holding that the loss of the right to
participate in political associations and to hold public office are penalties capable of coercing incriminating
testimony).
34
See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (“[I]n this case, petitioner was not asked to say or to do
anything. The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search
for and seizure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records were
introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner
to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not
present.”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (holding that where the petitioner had delivered
business and tax records to her accountant, she was not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent
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do.35 Included in the latter are cases where the individual lies,36 refuses to cooperate with a
permissible test,37 or engages in “guilty conduct.”38 The government has clearly applied too
much pressure—compulsion has occurred—where there has been physical or psychological
torture,39 or where a defendant, upon a grant of immunity, has been ordered to testify in court
under penalty of contempt.40
production of the documents pursuant to a subpoena served on the accountant because her “divestment of
possession” of the records had removed the “element of personal compulsion” necessary under the Fifth
Amendment).
35
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560-62 (1983) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation where the
state admitted at trial the defendant’s refusal to undergo a permissible blood-alcohol test because the response was
not compelled).
36
See, e.g., United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (finding that it was not error to admit false exculpatory
statements); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (holding that prosecution for making false statements on
wagering registration forms was not barred, though defendant could have validly refused to complete the form by
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination). It is possible to imagine a situation in which a suspect is
compelled to lie by being forced to sign a confession he knows is not true. This would satisfy the compulsion
component of a Fifth Amendment violation.
37
See, e.g., Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (finding no violation of the privilege for lack of compulsion where the state
admitted the defendant’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test that could be legitimately compelled by the state).
Refusals to speak, or choosing to remain silent, cannot be presented as evidence of guilt. This is not because the
refusal has been compelled but because to comment on silence may make the assertion of the right too burdensome.
See supra note xx and accompanying text.
38
When an individual engages in what might be described as “guilty conduct,” such as unprovoked flight from
police or destruction of evidence, there is no compulsion and thus no violation of the privilege if evidence of such
conduct is introduced at trial as circumstantial evidence of the individual’s consciousness of guilt. Professor
Arenella argued that use of “guilty conduct evidence” is not a violation of the Self-incrimination Clause but
emphasized that this was because the conduct was not “testimonial.” Arenella, supra note xx, at 43. We believe
that “guilty conduct evidence” is best analyzed under the compulsion component. Though the Supreme Court has
not squarely addressed this issue, it is firmly established that guilty conduct evidence may be presented and
commented on at trial without violating a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. See United States v. Carter,
236 F.3d 777, 792 n.11 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the following
instruction on flight: “You have received evidence that after the crime was supposed to have been committed, the
Defendant, Roquel Allen Carter, fled. If you believe from the evidence that the Defendant did indeed flee, then you
may consider this conduct, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the Government has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged. This conduct may indicate that he thought he was
guilty and was trying to avoid punishment. On the other hand, sometimes an innocent person may flee to avoid
being arrested, or for some other innocent reason.”).
39
See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002) (“Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves
a question of judgment: Courts must decide whether the consequences of an inmate’s choice to remain silent are
closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against which it
does not.”); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“One of [the privilege’s] purposes is to prevent the state,
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”).
See also Alschuler, supra note xx, at 192 (analyzing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of
the adoption of the amendment and concluding, “the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incriminating
interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future
punishment and promises of leniency.”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (creating the presumption of
compulsion in custodial interrogations after observing that “[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into
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These determinations of impermissible coercion do little more than reflect our
conventions about what pressure exceeds permissible levels (conventions that are informed, to be
sure, by common sense, although perhaps erroneous, views about free will). Professor Peter
Westen and Stewart Mandell recognized that compulsion is a continuous variable involving
different kinds or levels of pressure in differing settings.41 Not only is there a common-law line
demarking how much compulsion is necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation, but Westen and
Mandell suggested that different types of compulsion may require different procedures to avoid
Fifth Amendment violations.42 For example, a state can insist that an individual making a
compulsory tax filing make the “preferred response” of remaining silent rather than lying or

police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under the compulsion to speak.”).
40
See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (observing that the “classic Fifth Amendment violation” is
“telling a defendant at trial to testify.”); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (“Testimony given in
response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there is no question
whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant’s will; the witness is told to talk or face the
government’s coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt. The information given in response to a grant
of immunity may well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less
compelled. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against compelled self-incrimination, not
merely against unreliable self-incrimination. . . . Here, . . . we deal with the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form.”); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(finding that testimony obtained under a grant of immunity from state prosecution is compelled and thus cannot be
used in federal prosecution either).
In addition, the Court has constructed several prophylactic rules to protect the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment. For example, a defendant’s right to invoke the privilege cannot be made too “costly” by allowing the
prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965). In a formal
sense, the element of compulsion is lacking here because the defendant has taken an action contrary to what the state
wants him to do. Still, the Court has prohibited this and other state-imposed burdens where they may make the
assertion of the right too burdensome. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (stating that no
negative inferences may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify in the sentencing phase); Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must
give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ [from the failure to testify] jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so”);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (holding that the Federal Kidnaping Act, which provided that a
death sentence could only be imposed through a jury verdict, was unconstitutional because the effect was to
“discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (refusing to find that
it was harmless error for the prosecutor to repeatedly comment on the defendant’s failure to testify); Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (“In this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the
imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege ‘costly.’”).
41
Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the
“Preferred Response”, 91 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 535-40 (1982).
42
Id. at 535-37.
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incriminating himself.43

The constitutionally permissible consequences of not making this

“preferred response” are prosecution for perjury if the individual lies, or admission of the
incriminating statements against the individual in a prosecution of the substantive crime.44
Where compulsion takes the form of custodial interrogation, however, silence cannot be a
“preferred response” because a Fifth Amendment claim cannot be asserted through silence in
such a situation without “risking irreparable injury of the kind the privilege is designed to
prevent.”45 Westen and Mandell went on to consider several other types of compulsion and the
requirements for avoiding a Fifth Amendment violation.46 In essence, they provided a map of
what pressure is appropriate under what circumstances. Whether or not this map accurately
anticipates the Court’s future decisions, we predict that the Court will continue the common-law
process of locating types of pressure along its conception of the proper continuum and using
social conventions to determine if they are appropriate.

B.

Incrimination

The second component necessary to a violation of the Fifth Amendment is the risk of
incrimination. Some proceedings simply are not “criminal,” and thus there is no need to appraise
the “risk” that compelled testimony will be used against the individual. For example, there is no
incrimination where a witness has been granted immunity from criminal prosecution but still

43

Id. at 532 n.40 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 & n.21 (1976) (concluding that “since Garner
made disclosures instead of claiming the privilege on his tax returns his disclosures were not compelled
incriminations.”).
44
Id. at 532-33 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)).
45
Id. at 535-36 (“The state may not insist that a criminal suspect respond to custodial interrogation by remaining
silent. A suspect who is subjected to station house interrogation is constitutionally entitled to respond to police
compulsion by making an incriminating statement and later challenging its admission against him at trial. The
Supreme Court emphasized this point in Miranda v. Arizona.”).
46
Id. at 537-55 (analyzing several situations, including where there is insufficient time to reflect or where a witness
has reasonably relied on the state’s assurance of immunity).
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faces hardships such as the loss of a job or “general public opprobrium.”47 “The interdiction of
the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself—in other
words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the
criminality has already been taken away the Amendment ceases to apply.”48 In addition, the
Fifth Amendment is not implicated if the person resisting disclosure wishes to protect another
natural49 or legal person,50 or where the legal regulation is civil and the penalty is not punitive.51

47

Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956). See also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949)
(“If a witness could not be prosecuted on facts concerning which he testified, the witness could not fairly say he had
been compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. He might suffer disgrace and humiliation but
such unfortunate results to him are outside of constitutional protection.”).
48
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906), cited in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956). See also,
Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2000 (2003) (“We fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment,
Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to
be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”).
49
See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (holding that where a taxpayer gave her tax records to
her accountant, and the “accountant makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the production,” he too
is precluded from invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protections); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)
(“the privilege against self-incrimination ‘is solely for the benefit of the witness,’ and ‘'is purely a personal privilege
of the witness.’ Petitioner expressly placed her original declination to answer on an untenable ground, since a
refusal to answer cannot be justified by a desire to protect others from punishment, much less to protect another
from interrogation by a grand jury.”).
50
See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (Whether an entity is entitled to protection turns on an
inquiry into whether “a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common or group interests only.”); George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S.
286, 288 (1967) (“the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ‘essentially a personal one, applying only
to natural individuals.’ It ‘cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.’”) (quoting
White, 322 U.S. at 698-99); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (Communist Party may not claim
the privilege); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974) (small law partnership may not claim the
privilege). But see United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984) (holding that a sole proprietor’s act of
production may be protected under the privilege).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980) (mere civil liability “does not trigger all the protections
afforded by the Constitution to criminal defendants.”); United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S.
715, 718 (1971) (relying on Boyd v. United States for the proposition that “‘proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in
form, are in their nature criminal’ for Fifth Amendment purposes” and holding that where “money liability is
predicated upon a finding of the owner’s wrongful conduct,” the Fifth Amendment may be invoked in forfeiture
proceedings); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (finding, with regards to the
registration requirements for members of the Communist Party under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
that “Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an
inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might
involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.”).
Deportation hearings are probably not “criminal” for Fifth Amendment purposes. See INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (Noting that a “deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this
country is itself a crime” and so “various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a
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Within criminal proceedings, “risk” component is a variable. “The central standard for
the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.”52 Like compulsion, there is no
analytical dividing point that can explain why courts find no violation with an incrimination
likelihood of x, but do find a violation with a quantity of x + 1. The “substantial and real” test is
an attempt to locate on the continuum the threshold likelihood of incrimination that will trigger
the Fifth Amendment protection. Through case-by-case analysis, the Court has placed various
types of cases on either side of the threshold. The threshold has not been met and there is no
violation where, for example, information disclosures required by statute will not typically result
in the production of incriminating information,53 the government requires that records in “an
essentially non-criminal and regulatory area” be kept and disclosed,54 a witness has “a future
intention to commit perjury . . . if granted immunity because of a claim of compulsory selfdeportation hearing.”); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (“Miranda warnings are not
applicable in a deportation setting”).
52
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
53
See, e.g, California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428-430 (1971) (upholding California’s “hit and run” statute which
required drivers of cars involved in accidents to stop at the scene and provide their names and addresses because the
statute “was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising
from automobile accidents.” “[T]he mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in
favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here.”); Baltimore City Department of Social
Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990) (holding that a mother who refused to produce her child at the
demand of the Department of Social Services, even though the production may incriminate her in a crime, “may not
invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production
and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.”).
54
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968). Under the “required records” doctrine, the government can
require individuals and entities to keep and disclose certain types of records. For example, the government may
require that income records be kept and disclosed in tax returns, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), or
that product pricing information be provided to the government under the Emergency Price Control Act, Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court has allowed disclosure requirements in “required records” cases only
where incrimination is not likely. To fit within the doctrine, the records must be “customarily kept,” be of a “public
character,” and be within “an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry.” Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 56-57.
In Marchetti, the Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction under federal wagering laws that required disclosure of
illegal gambling, reasoning that “[t]he United States’ principle interest is evidently the collection of revenue, and not
the punishment of gamblers; but the characteristics of the activities about which information is sought, and the
composition of the groups to which inquiries are made, readily distinguish this situation from that in Shapiro”
because the requirements “are directed to a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Id. at 58
(internal citation omitted). See also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (reversing a conviction under the
National Firearms Act which required registration of illegal weapons because “[t]he hazards of incrimination created
by the registration requirement [are] ‘real and appreciable.’”).
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incrimination,”55 self-incriminating information will not be available to law enforcement
agencies,56 or an individual faces only foreign criminal liability.57 The threshold for Fifth
Amendment incrimination is met where compliance with a registration act “will significantly
enhance the likelihood” of prosecution for future acts, and will “readily provide evidence which
will facilitate” convictions.58 In John Doe’s case, a court would certainly find that knowledge of
the location of a crime victim is sufficiently incriminating.

C.

The Problem of Defining “Testimony”

The third component of a self-incrimination violation is testimony,59 the source of most
of the modern theoretical problems. The Court has failed to provide a definition of “testimony”
that can explain its own cases.

This has led commentators to interesting, but uniformly

unconvincing, speculations as to what might explain the Fifth Amendment. We discuss here the
problems posed for both the Court and the commentators by the absence of a plausible
conception of “testimony.” In the next section we solve the riddle by showing that testimony, for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, is the substantive results of cognition, and that this explains
both the cases and the polygraph hypothetical.

55

United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980).
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971) (reversing the dismissal of an indictment for possession of
unregistered hand grenades; the registration statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment because any risk of
incrimination was “merely ‘trifling or imaginary’” and not “substantial and real.”).
57
Compare Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 78 (1964) (“the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness
against incrimination under state as well as federal law”), with United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1998)
(holding that a suspected Nazi war criminal may not invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination where his
responses to questions would not subject him to prosecution under domestic law but may make him vulnerable to
criminal prosecution in Lithuania, Israel, and Germany because “concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the
scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”).
58
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
59
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the
accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
56
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In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court made an explicit effort to define the
parameters of “testimony.”60 The defendant in Schmerber appealed his conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol on the grounds that his right against self-incrimination had been
violated when the police ordered a hospital physician to extract the defendant’s blood despite the
defendant’s refusal to consent.61 A lab test indicated intoxication and was later admitted in
evidence at trial.62 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that “the privilege
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.”63
The Court acknowledged that the distinction between “testimony” and “real or physical
evidence” is not always easily drawn.64 A polygraph test, according to the Court, will measure
physiological changes during an interrogation and thus the results could be construed as physical
or real, like the blood-alcohol test at issue in Schmerber.65 Without remedying this obvious flaw
in the theory, the Court simply asserted that “[t]o compel a person to submit to testing in which
an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”66
The Court did not find any of the same concerns in the blood test under consideration, but
provided no explanation for the distinction.67

60

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Id. at 758-59.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 761.
64
Id. at 764.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 765.
61
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Seventeen years later, the Court again did little more than note the polygraph problem
when it considered the testimonial/physical distinction in South Dakota v. Neville.68 As it had
done in Schmerber,the Court concluded without explanation that, although the lie detector test
seeks to obtain physical evidence, “to compel a person to submit to such testing ‘is to evoke the
spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.’”69 The problem is obvious: the very test that the
Court advances, which is to distinguish between “testimony” and “real or physical evidence,”
cannot provide answers in important cases.
Consider whether anything that was forcefully taken from Doe is “testimonial.”70 The
only things extracted and presented to the jury were his heart rate, blood pressure, rate of
breathing, and electrodermal responses.

The physical data obtained through a scientific

procedure seems analogous to the blood extracted and tested in Schmerber.

If there is a

difference, the testimonial/real distinction cannot capture it. The test was designed for, and
succeeded in, excluding physical exemplars71 and medical extractions72 from Fifth Amendment
protection, but it fails to explain the reoccurring specter of the polygraph.
Scholars have tried unsuccessfully to rectify this flaw.73 One approach has focused on
privacy as a core value and indicator of “testimony.”74 Whether or not privacy is a core Fifth

68

459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983).
Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764).
70
See supra pp. xx-xx.
71
See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding that a defendant may be compelled to try on a blouse).
72
See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
73
For comprehensive evaluations of the many proposed theories, see Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra
note xx; David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1063 (1986); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation--And the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 78 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711-18 (1988); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
74
See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 485 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“the Fifth Amendment
protects an individual citizen against the compelled production of testimonial matter that might tend to incriminate
him, provided it is matter that comes within the zone of privacy recognized by the Amendment to secure to the
69
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Amendment value, it obviously cannot explain why the privilege applies when it does. A
privacy interest would obviously include the right to exclude the government from what’s inside
one’s body, like the blood taken in Schmerber.75 In an effort to avoid this point, Professor
Arenella argued that perhaps “mental privacy,” as distinguished from physical privacy, is “at the
heart of the privilege.”76 He used both psychological examinations and the polygraph as a
demonstration of “the futility of trying to separate one’s definition of what constitutes testimony
for fifth amendment purposes from one’s view of the core values that are impaired by permitting
testimonial compulsion.”77 Assuming that the “privilege’s primary objective is to prevent the
state from intruding upon the individual’s mental privacy,” Arenella concluded that the privilege
should apply where the “state forces the accused to disclose involuntarily his private thoughts,
feelings, and beliefs about the crime charged and then proposes to make testimonial use of these
extracted thoughts.”78

His mental-privacy-plus-testimonial-use test seems to give the right

answer in the case of John Doe’s polygraph test. His theory, however, cannot overcome the
other main problem of privacy-based theories.
The most serious difficulty for the theory that privacy is the explanatory variable is that
the Fifth Amendment in virtually no way responds to it. It is indisputable that the government
has “a right to every man’s evidence,” if that evidence incriminates another person, such as a

individual ‘a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.’”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1973)); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the Fifth Amendment marks
‘a zone of privacy’ which the Government may not force a person to surrender.”).
75
Arenella, supra note xx, at 40-41 (“While privacy concerns may justify the privilege’s prohibition of testimonial
compulsion, they do not explain why the state may extract physical evidence from the accused. . . . When the state
uses compulsion to extract physical evidence from a suspect and then uses that evidence against him, the state
intrudes upon the individual’s privacy by gaining physical access to his body and securing information about him.”).
76
Id. at 40-42, cited in Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234 n.18.
77
Id. at 42 n.63, 44.
78
Id. at 43-44 (emphasis in original).
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friend or a family member.79 The state can even compel self-incriminating testimony with a
grant of immunity.80 Given these powers of the government to demand evidence from every area
of our personal lives, it is hard to see how privacy can be a guidepost for identifying where the
right against self-incrimination applies.81 These governmental powers also explain the failure of
theories based on personal autonomy, a variation of the privacy theories.82
Arenella asserted that this problem disappears “once one recognizes that the privilege
only protects against invasions of mental privacy that impair accusatorial process values.”83 By
this he presumably means that the “accusatorial process norms” that are also core values of the
privilege, namely things like the “preference for an accusatorial system and fair state-individual
balance,” explain why the privilege does not apply when immunity is granted or when
information is sought against a third person.84 The problem is that this argument is ad hoc. To
explain the cases it asserts that when privacy does not lead to the correct result some other norm
trumps it. But why? And how can one predict the outcome of the next case? In essence, another
“value” is added to describe each of the Court’s seemingly contradictory cases.
Professor Michael Dann tried a different variation of the privacy theory in his criticisms
of the testimonial/real distinction.85 He hypothesized that the protection of “one’s mental and

79

See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (recognizing that the “general common-law principle that
the public has a right to every man’s evidence” is considered an indubitable certainty) (internal quotations omitted).
80
See id. at 445 (recognizing that immunity statutes “have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence”)
(citing L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328, 495 (1968)).
81
See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1233-34 (“There are, however, two major stumbling
blocks to a privacy theory of the privilege. First, the privilege does not protect physical evidence, but instead
prohibits only compelled “testimonial” or “communicative” conduct. . . . The second problem is more devastating.
The privilege applies only to testimony that is incriminating.”); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: SelfIncrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 388 (1979) (there is a “incoherence
between the focus of privacy and the Fifth Amendment’s obvious preoccupation with self-incrimination”), quoted in
Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
82
See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234-35.
83
Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
84
Id. at 40, 40 n.58.
85
See B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence
from a Suspect, 43 U.S.C. L. REV. 597, 598 (1970). Professors Robert Gerstein and Samuel Alito have presented
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emotional state including personal thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and information” is the “raison
d’etre” for the Fifth Amendment privilege.86 A violation of the privilege can be detected, he
argued, where “psychologically intrusive compulsion occurred.”87 Dann was right to look to the
nature of the suspect’s involvement rather than whether the character of the information derived
was real or testimonial. His theory, however, also fails to explain the cases.
Dann’s reason for looking to whether “psychologically intrusive compulsion” has
occurred is to discover if the “accused can or cannot reasonably believe that he can affect the
result” of the disclosure.88

If this belief is possible, then the accused will suffer the

“psychological pain occasioned by forcing an accused” into “the trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt.”89

This argument based on psychological cruelty generally has been

rejected.90 Dann was concerned not only about the “psychological pain” of the individual,
however, but also about the likelihood that the person who “has the power to alter the evidence”
will actually choose to do so and thus undermine the truth-seeking function of criminal
investigations and trials.91
The focus on choice has practical allure because it can ground the privilege in the
unassailable goal of promoting the use of reliable evidence in solving and prosecuting crimes.
variations on this same argument. See Gerstein, supra note 33, at 346 n.17 (“What makes an act testimonial is the
fact-finder’s reliance upon the actor’s oral responsibility for truthtelling in making use of its as evidence. This, in
turn, must imply the existence of an opportunity to be truthful or not.”), cited in Arenella, supra note 26, at 44 n.70;
Samuel A. Alito, Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. LAW. REV. 27, 47 (1986) (“A
person served with a subpoena for incriminating evidence in his possession has three practical alternatives: first, he
can comply; second, he can claim the fifth amendment privilege; and third, he can falsely deny the existence of the
evidence or destroy it. . . . [T]he rational, unscrupulous witness will turn over documents and thus concede
possession only when that concession is either not incriminating or is believed to reveal no more than can be proved
independently.”), cited in, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 n.23 (2000)).
86
Dann, supra note xx, at 611.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 598.
89
Id. at 604 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
90
See Allen The Simpson Affair, supra note xx, at 1016 (describing the theory as “bizarre”) (citing Schulhofer,
supra note xx, at 318 (“Notice that the innocent defendant faces no trilemma, no dilemma, in fact no problem at
all.”); Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1237-39.
91
See Dann, supra note xx, at 612.
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The privilege would apply when the witness produces evidence after having the opportunity to
choose whether to do so honestly. There are strong policy reasons for not wanting to rely on
evidence from someone who has an incentive to hide the truth. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, Justice
Brennan wrote for a majority that “[w]henever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to
communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the
‘trilemma’ of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity)
contains a testimonial component.”92
In an interesting reworking of the choice theory, Professor Stuntz, suggested that the
Fifth Amendment can be explained as an excuse theory.93 “The central principle underlying
[excuse] doctrines is that absent a compelling reason to do otherwise,” he explained, “people
should not be held to a standard higher than that which their judges can meet.”94 In the Fifth
Amendment context, if “even honest people would commit perjury when asked under oath to
confess to criminal conduct, then a serious argument for excusing perjury in such cases would
exist.”95 Since there are serious policy problems that would result from excusing perjury, he
concludes, silence rather than perjury is immunized under the privilege.96
Under Stuntz’s excuse theory, silence is immunized when the person is in a situation in
which “even honest people” may be tempted to commit perjury.97 This is similar to the choice or
truthtelling theories which also rely on the premise that criminal investigations and trials should
not rely on the compelled testimony of someone with a significant incentive to lie. Stuntz’s

92

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990). See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (“Surely the Government is in
no way relying on the ‘truth-telling’ of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents.”)
(citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264); Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43, n.23 (again citing Wigmore and describing a
subpoena duces tecum as a ‘process relying on [the witness’] moral responsibility for truthtelling”)).
93
See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx.
94
Id. at 1229.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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theory does a better job of explaining why we immunize silence in criminal cases but allow a
defendant with an incentive to lie to voluntarily testify in his own defense. Still, his theory fails
to explain both the lie detector hypothetical and a number of the Court’s cases.
As Arenella pointed out, a theory based on choice cannot explain our John Doe
hypothetical.98 Doe did not implicate himself after a “cruel” decision was put to him. Rather,
the officers were able to extract from him, without his cooperation, the evidence they needed.
He engaged in no “volitional acts” and had no “power to alter the evidence.”99 “Since an
effective and reliable lie detector test deprives the individual of any opportunity to deceive the
questioner,” Arenella explained, its results might be admissible under a choice-based theory.100
The “truthtelling” inquiry, even under Stuntz’s theory, fails because “there is no falsehood to
excuse and therefore no need to immunize noncooperation.”101
More tellingly, these theories fail to explain both the exemplar and the subpoena cases.
The Court has not extended the privilege to cases where an individual is compelled to give an
example of his handwriting, the way he talks, or how he looks in a particular piece of clothing.102
Dann acknowledged that under his theory there should be Fifth Amendment protection in
exemplar and demonstration cases,103 though this is inconsistent with the cases.
Stuntz tried to explain away the problem:
Handwriting and voice samples can be altered, so that if alteration were excusable
for the same reason as self-protective perjury, noncooperation with the police
ought to be immunized. On the other hand, it may be that handwriting and voice

98

Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
Dann, supra note xx, at 619.
100
See Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
101
Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1276.
102
See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding that a defendant may be compelled to try on a blouse).
103
See Dann, supra note xx, at 622-25, 627-29.
99
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exemplars are outside the scope of the privilege because plausible alteration,
while possible, is very difficult.104
Dann explained why this explanation doesn’t avoid the problem:
It should not be determinative that “deceit is improbable” in the giving of a voice
or handwriting sample since such evidence can be disguised. Even though the
deceit is successful for only some “talented” people, only some people are able to
lie successfully. Such a distinction, however, is irrelevant. . . . As long as there is
any possibility of successful deceit, the average person, talented or not, will have
to decide whether to attempt to disguise the sample; this is precisely the trilemma
the privilege seeks to guard against.105
These theories also fail to explain the document subpoena cases like Fisher. Plainly a
person required to disgorge incriminating documents has a choice and would have an incentive
to adulterate their contents by purging any incriminatory material. And yet, direct immunity is
limited to the act of production.106
The polygraph test and exemplar cases all create problems for the current theories of the
Fifth Amendment. Privacy- and choice-based theories fail to properly predict the outcome of
cases. The next section presents a theory that can explain all of the cases.

D.

A Comprehensive Theory of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

104

Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1276-77.
Professors Daniel Seidman and Alex Stein have proposed another version of the choice theory. See Daniel
J. Seidman & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 474-80 (2000). In considering the broad right to silence under
Miranda, Seidman and Stein try to predict, through “behavioral modeling,” what suspects will do when interrogated.
Id. at 432-40. They challenge the notion that the right to silence requires subordination of society’s interests “to
those of the criminal.” Id. at 436.
After presenting their theory, Seidman and Stein claim a “doctrinal fit” between it and the Fifth
Amendment cases. Id. at 474-80. Their “organizing principle” with regards to “testimony” reveals itself to be just a
restatement of the choice theories. Id. They state that the opportunity for “truthtelling” is the determinative
distinction and that the privilege exists only when there is a “meaningful fabrication alternative.” Id. at 479-80. As
must the other proponents of choice or privacy theories, however, Seidman and Stein concede that their theory is
“admittedly incongruent with” the exemplar cases. Id. at 477. Rather than addressing the problem, however, they
simply conclude that the Court’s holdings in exemplar cases are “unjustifiable.” Id. See also Stephanos Bibas, The
Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421 (2002) (criticizing the Seidman and Stein article
for its failing to “mirror reality”).
105
Dann, supra note xx, at 623.
106
As we discuss below, perhaps Hubbell extends derivative immunity to the contents of documents. Even if it
does, however, the privacy/choice theories still cannot explain the other cases discussed here.
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As we have been suggesting throughout the earlier sections of this article, a simple
correction to the understanding of “testimony” yields an explanation of all the cases. In the
cases, “testimony” means substantive cognition—the product of cognition that results in holding
or asserting propositions with truth-value. Although never expressly formulating a cognitionbased test, the Court has acknowledged that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of information from the
accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the
Self-Incrimination Clause.”107 It has never gone the further step to develop explicitly a test
based on this observation, but functionally, this is precisely what the Court has been doing.108
This leads to the following explanation or theory: The government may not compel revelation of
the incriminating substantive results of cognition caused by the state.
Cognition “involves the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of knowledge.”109 We use
the term to refer to these intellectual processes that allow one to gain and make use of
substantive knowledge and to compare one’s “inner world” (previous knowledge) with the
“outside world” (including stimuli, such as a question from an interrogator).110 Excluded are

107

Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (Doe II) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973)
and Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (also
quoting Couch and Curcio). See also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“Physical acts will constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the
witness.”).
108
Professor Uviller recognized that “personal control over the production of cognitive evidence, free of official
coercion, is guaranteed by the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.” H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from
the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1137 (1987). He was engaged in a different project when he wrote this and did not develop the significance of
the idea for the Fifth Amendment. Uviller’s article argues that the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment cases
“misappropriated the right to the services of counsel . . . and deployed it as an awkward and ill-suited restraint upon
the access of law enforcement officers to the thoughts of a suspect.” Id. at 1212. His 2001 article on the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not make any explicit mention of “cognition” but he does interpret Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Schmerber as saying that “no one can be forced to divulge cerebral evidence, to speak the contents and
products of the mind” and emphasizes the Court’s “contents of his own mind” language in Hubbell. H. Richard
Uviller, Forward: Fisher Goes on the Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2001). Uviller deserves credit for these observations. Our effort here is considerably different
from Prof. Uviller’s, however. We are attempting to show not just that cognition has something to do with the Fifth
Amendment but that it is critical to understanding the scope and limitations of the cases.
109
MARGARET W. MATLIN, COGNITION 2 (3d ed. 1994).
110
Id. at 26 (using these terms in a different context).
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simple psychological responses to stimuli such as fear, warmness, and hunger; the mental
processes that produce muscular movements; and one’s will or faculty for choice.111
It is important to note that state action is required to trigger both the cognition and the
disclosure of the results. There would be nothing objectionable about the police compelling a
suspect to think about whether he was guilty if the conclusion was never elicited or was
disclosed voluntarily. Obversely, even when cognition is involved in the original creation of
documents, their contents are not directly protected.112 The state must cause the cognition, such
as that involved in responding to a subpoena, before the Fifth Amendment is implicated. We
discuss below how the contents of voluntarily made documents may enjoy derivative protection
under Hubbell.113 Still, the direct protection extends only to the cognition caused by the state,
the paradigmatic example being the retrieval of information from memory in response to a
question. Finally, only the incriminating substantive results of cognition are protected from
compelled disclosure.

The fact or quality of cognition is not protected but only those

propositions with truth-value that would tend to incriminate the author.
Our theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause—that the government may not compel
revelation of the incriminating substantive results of cognition—can explain all of the cases. As
in all theories of the Fifth Amendment, the variables of compulsion114 and incrimination will

111

The distinction between cognition and the will is one of kind, not of degree. As stated above, we use “cognition”
to refer to holding or generating propositions with truth-value. See infra p. **. One’s will or faculty for choice, on
the other hand, does not itself have propositional content. Still, it may be exercised in conjunction with cognition.
For example, a suspect may say to himself, “I am guilty and therefore I will lie to the police.” The thought, “I am
guilty,” is a proposition with truth-value but if the state never compels its disclosure, the Fifth Amendment isn’t
implicated. The choice to lie, however, does not have any propositional content. The content of the lie itself will
have truth-value but, as explained in Part I.A., the Fifth Amendment is not implicated when a suspect lies because
there is no compulsion. This distinction between cognition and the faculty of choice is explained further in the
discussion of the exemplar cases below.
112
United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (“We therefore hold that the contents of those records are
not privileged.”), quoted in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).
113
See infra pp. xx-xx.
114
As discussed above, refusals to submit to tests generally lack the component of compulsion because it is the
opposite result of what the State is seeking. See supra pp. xx; South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). Even
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exclude some cases from protection categorically, and others when the judicially-created
threshold is not met. However, the cases that are problematic for other theories can be explained
by ours, as can the polygraph hypothetical.
In John Doe’s case, the government would be prohibited from using the polygraph results
of the unspeaking suspect. The officer asking questions caused Doe to engage in cognition.
Though he made no oral responses, his differing physiological responses to suggestions about the
location of the little girl are a by-product of those thoughts; indeed, the evidence of responses
would be relevant only if they were a reliable code—a language, in other words—of those
thoughts. The officer’s questions caused Doe (outside stimuli) to retrieve his own previous
knowledge and arrive at answers to the questions. Despite Doe’s stubborn resistance, the officer
also compelled the revelation of the substantive results of this cognition by capturing Doe’s
physiological responses that are a code for his thoughts. Since the substantive content of his
thoughts, as reported through those physiological responses, was incriminating, the privilege
should apply.
The same analysis applies to psychological examinations.

Plainly, the information

extracted can be considered medical like the blood in Schmerber, and yet the privilege is still
implicated.115 The patient is compelled to compare the meaning of the doctor’s statements with
his own knowledge and experiences and to arrive at incriminating substantive answers which are
if one could imagine a situation in which a refusal was somehow compelled, however, the refusal would still not
trigger the privilege for lack of cognition. An unadorned refusal does not reveal substantive knowledge derived
from perceptions or ideas. Though a witness to the refusal may think that it reveals something about the person’s
knowledge (possibly his own guilt), the additional assumption of the witness does not transform the bare abstention
into the revelation of cognition.
115
The Court has recognized that, similar to the polygraph, psychological examination can be problematic under the
testimonial/physical test. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983) (“A second example of
seemingly physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth Amendment protection was presented in Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). There, we held that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected compelled disclosures
during a court-ordered psychiatric examination. We specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was
observing the patient’s communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the
patient’s statements.”).
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then extracted through compulsion. In the cases to date, the Court has concluded that those
answers would be used substantively. In Estelle v. Smith, the Court “specifically rejected the
claim that the psychiatrist [in a court-ordered examination] was observing the patient’s
communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the
patient’s statements.”116 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Fifth Amendment was
inapposite because the defendant’s communications to the doctor were “nontestimonial in
nature”:
However, Dr. Grigson’s diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not based
simply on his observation of respondent. Rather, Dr. Grigson drew his
conclusions largely from respondent’s account of the crime during their interview,
and he placed particular emphasis on what he considered to be respondent’s lack
of remorse. Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting the details of the
crime. The Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, is directly involved here
because the State used as evidence against respondent the substance of his
disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination.117
Since the substantive results of cognition were compelled and incriminating, the Fifth
Amendment was violated. This is precisely as our theory predicts. We also predict, however,
that psychological exams that carry no risk of using substantive responses to questions as
substantive evidence against the accused would not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Consistent with the holding of Schmerber, medical tests are not privileged under this
theory.

Schmerber can be restated in terms of cognition.

In standard medical exams a

patient/suspect is not compelled to engage in cognition at all and the test results do not reveal
any knowledge or substantive results of cognition. The tests could presumably be performed on
a totally non-thinking individual.

Although the testimonial/real analysis cannot make the

necessary distinction between medical and psychological tests, the cognition test shows that only
116
117

South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1981).
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the latter should be protected because even the completely uncooperative suspect can be
compelled to reveal the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition.
Exemplar cases also can be explained. These cases do not trigger the privilege because,
though the person must understand the command and respond accordingly (comparing the
outside stimulus with his previous knowledge), no substantive knowledge is dislodged. When
one only has to present, or refrain from hiding, personal characteristics, there is no disclosure of
the results of cognition. Signing one’s name or trying on a blouse involves some mental effort in
understanding the directions and complying with them. Still, there is no revelation of the
substantive results of cognition. All that is revealed is the use of the will or faculty of deliberate
action in following directions and signing one’s name normally. There is no assertion disclosed,
only the decision not to let one’s will interfere with the naturalness of the response. This
decision is a choice and this point highlights the important difference between a cognition-based
theory and one that relies on the presence of choice. Choice theories get exemplar cases
wrong.118
The Court’s decision in United States v. Doe (Doe II) further demonstrates this point.119
There, a court order compelled a target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to
disclose records of his accounts.120 The target was compelled to sign a form that “purported to
apply to any and all accounts over which Doe had a right of withdrawal, without acknowledging
the existence of any such account.”121 The Court analogized the demand to exemplar cases and
explained:
We do not disagree with the dissent that “[t]he expression of the contents of an
individual’s mind” is testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. . . . We
118

See supra pp. xx-xx.
Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
120
Id. at 202.
121
Id. at 204.
119
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simply disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the execution of the consent
directive at issue here forced petitioner to express the contents of his mind. In our
view, such compulsion is more like “be[ing] forced to surrender a key to a
strongbox containing incriminating documents” than it is like “be[ing] compelled
to reveal the combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.”122
The Court concluded that because the consent directive was not “testimonial in nature,” “the
District Court’s order compelling petitioner to sign the directive does not violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”123 In Doe II, as in exemplar cases, the target
had to use his will or faculty of deliberate action to follow directions in signing his name.
Complying with the order, however, did not require Doe to disclose the substantive results of
cognition.124
It is possible to imagine a case falling somewhere between an interrogation and a demand
for an exemplar or demonstration. If the police have evidence that the perpetrator of a crime is a
piano player, the Fifth Amendment may be implicated if the police ask a suspect to list the
instruments he can play. It is no less problematic if the police tell the suspect to demonstrate
playing all of the instruments he can play. In both cases, the suspect is compelled to reveal the
substantive results of cognition, namely, the assertion “I can play the piano.” If there is any
122

Id. at 210 n.9. Interestingly, we think this dicta in error. A person forced to turn over a key would be
incriminated through the use of compelled cognition, just as a person forced to disclose the contents of a
combination would be. Knowledge of the hiding place of the key plainly involves propositions with truth value that
would be created, extracted, and its fruits used against the individual. As we develop in Sec. II, if hypotheticals like
this do not involve a Fifth Amendment violation, it will be because of either a broad reading of Hubbell or a narrow
reading of the derivative use doctrine. Doe presents a different issue, notwithstanding the majority’s misuse of the
comparison between keys and combinations. Doe does not involve extracting the substantive content of cognition; it
involves only will.
123
Id. at 219.
124
It should be noted that Doe II presents a different situation from California v. Byers, 420 U.S. 424 (1971), though
both cases involve the compelled presentation of one’s name. In Byers, California’s “hit and run” statute required
drivers of cars involved in accidents to stop at the scene and provide their names and addresses. The driver, like the
target in Doe II, had to understand the command and respond accordingly by comparing the outside stimulus of the
accident with his previous knowledge of the law. In stating his name, however, the driver had to disclose a
proposition with truth-value, namely, that he had driven the car and gotten into the accident. Thus, the cognition
component of a Fifth Amendment violation was present in Byers. However, because most traffic accidents do not
create criminal liability, the Court concluded that the risk of incrimination was so low as to not cross the threshold
necessary for a Fifth Amendment claim, and thus the statute was upheld. Id. at 428 (upholding the statute because it
created only a “mere possibility of incrimination,” which was insufficient for a Fifth Amendment violation). See
supra note xx and accompanying text.
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analogous statement implicit in traditional exemplar cases, such as “I know how to wear a
blouse” or “I know how to sign my name,” these propositions are generally not themselves
incriminating. The prosecutor does not seek to convince a jury that the fact that the defendant
knows how to wear a blouse makes it more likely that he was the one who committed the crime.
Rather, the demonstration is presented as physical evidence devoid of cognitive content. All that
is dislodged in such a situation is the defendant’s decision not to let his will interfere with the
natural way in which he wears a blouse. As explained above, the exercise of the will or faculty
for deliberate action does not implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege.125
Finally, the act of production cases also can be explained. All subpoenas for documents
or other tangible evidence involve cognition.

The government, through its issuance of a

subpoena, causes cognition through the recipient reading the subpoena, comparing its language
with his own knowledge, and arriving at substantive answers as to which documents satisfy the
demands of the subpoena. The government then, through a grant of immunity or threat of
contempt, compels the disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of that compelled
cognition.

However, the act of production cases do pose unanswered questions about the

development of the Fifth Amendment. We turn to these questions in the following section.
Perhaps the only datum not obviously explained by our theory is the sixth birthday
question in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,126 but it, too, is consistent. In Muniz, a drunk-driving suspect
was arrested and taken to a police station where he was told that his actions and voice would be
recorded on video, but he was not advised of his Miranda rights.127 This exchange followed:
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Officer Hosterman first asked Muniz his name, address, height, weight, eye color,
date of birth, and current age.
He responded to each of these questions,
stumbling over his address and age. The officer then asked Muniz, “Do you
know what the date was of your sixth birthday?”
After Muniz offered an
inaudible reply, the officer repeated, “When you turned six years old, do you
remember what the date was?” Muniz responded, “No, I don’t.”128
Following this discussion, the police officers performed three sobriety tests that had also been
done on the roadside.129

The suspect made several incriminating statements reflecting his

inability to follow directions while trying to perform these tests.130 The Court considered
whether any of the suspect’s “utterances” constituted “testimonial responses to custodial
interrogation for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”131 The Court delivered a complex
web of opinions. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, representing four votes.132 Justice
Rehnquist also represented four votes, joining Brennan’s opinion on some issues and dissenting
on others.133 Finally, Justice Marshall wrote only for himself, and though providing an important
vote for the plurality, presented reasoning different from all eight other Justices.
Eight Justices agreed that “any verbal statements that were both testimonial in nature and
elicited during custodial interrogation should be suppressed” because of the failure by the police
to advise the suspect of his Miranda rights.134 These same eight all agreed that “[r]equiring a
suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal
the physical properties of the sound produced by his voice, does not, without more, compel him
to provide a ‘testimonial’ response for purposes of the privilege.”135 Citing several exemplar
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cases, the Court held that the fact that the suspect slurred his speech was not protected.136 The
sobriety tests were also held to be permissible under Schmerber and the statements made during
the sobriety tests were found to be “voluntary” under Neville since the police did nothing to
solicit the statements.137 This is all consistent with our theory.
With regard to the first seven questions eliciting the suspect’s name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age, Justice Brennan, with four votes, asserted that
the statements and their delivery need not be suppressed because they fall within the routine
booking exception.138 Rehnquist’s four found that the statements needn’t be suppressed because
they were not “testimonial.”139
suppressed.140

Only Justice Marshall felt the statements should be

Again, the decision not to suppress these statements is consistent with our

theory—no substantive products of cognition were extracted to be used against the defendant.
The most contentious issue in the case was the sixth birthday question, and it is also the
greatest challenge to us. Justice Brennan, still representing four votes, found this to be different
from the first seven questions because it “was incriminating, not just because of his delivery, but
also because of his answer’s content; the trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he
did not know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.”141 The questions “required a
testimonial response” that the state “cared about.”142

Justice Rehnquist’s four dissenters,

disagreed:
If the police may require Muniz to use his body in order to demonstrate the level
of his physical coordination, there is no reason why they should not be able to
136
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require him to speak or write in order to determine his mental coordination. That
was all that was sought here. Since it was permissible for the police to extract
and examine a sample of Schmerber’s blood to determine how much that part of
his system had been affected by alcohol, I see no reason why they may not
examine the functioning of Muniz’s mental processes for the same purpose.143
Justice Marshall cast the deciding vote by concurring with Justice Brennan’s opinion that
“the ‘sixth birthday question’ required a testimonial response from respondent Muniz.”144
Before concluding that the Court held that Muniz’s response to the sixth birthday question was
testimonial, however, it is necessary to look more closely at Marshall’s concurrence.

His

reasoning differs so dramatically from that of all eight other Justices reveals that the sixth
birthday question was never decided by a majority of the Court.
Justice Marshall reasoned that everything Mr. Muniz said or did was in the context of
custodial questioning, and since no Miranda warning was given, all of his incriminating actions
and statements should have been suppressed.145 Thus, Marshall implicitly agreed with the
dissenters that no distinction should be drawn between the first seven questions as to Mr.
Muniz’s name, address, height, etc., the sobriety tests, and the “sixth birthday question,” though
he disagreed about the consequence of this conclusion.146 More importantly, his concurrence
reveals the hollowness of his assertion that everything said or done in front of the police officers
was testimonial. He admitted:
I continue to have serious reservations about the Court’s limitation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to “testimonial” evidence. See United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19, 32-38 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I believe that privilege extends
to any evidence that a person is compelled to furnish against himself. At the very
least, the privilege includes evidence that can be obtained only through the
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person’s affirmative cooperation. Of course, a person’s refusal to incriminate
himself also cannot be used against him.147
Marshall wrote that, if Muniz had raised the issue, he would have found that even Muniz’s
performance of the sobriety tests and his refusal to take the breathalyzer examination violate the
Fifth Amendment.148 The videotape showing these events should have been suppressed, he
argued.149
Though Marshall cooperatively labeled everything “testimonial” to reach the desired
result, he explicitly stated in his concurrence that he thought that “[t]he far better course would
be to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by requiring police to preface all direct questioning of a
suspect with Miranda warnings” regardless of the type of evidence elicited.150 The rule should
apply, he urged, when the police delayed processing Mr. Muniz for the purpose of observing
him, even though no questions were asked, because his actions and statements during this time
were likely to be incriminating.151 The rule also should apply when Mr. Muniz counted to six
rather than to thirty as he was instructed, because “his failure to complete the count was
incriminating in itself.”152 Marshall called all of these things “testimonial” so that as many of
them as possible would be suppressed within the framework adopted by the rest of the Court.
Although Marshall stated that the sixth birthday question is testimonial, his vote on this issue is
undermined by his failure to agree with Brennan about the distinction between this question and
the sobriety tests. Marshall’s concurrence should be read as a vote for bolstering the Miranda
prophylactic rule and not as a vote on the competing theories of the testimonial/physical
distinction.
147
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A holding of the Court that the sixth birthday question violates the Fifth Amendment
would be inconsistent with our theory (although note that it is the only case that we would not be
able to explain as compared to other theories that have considerably greater problems in this
regard). It is true that cognition is involved in knowing one’s birthday but the revelation of the
substantive knowledge is not incriminating. The fact that the suspect had difficulty making the
calculation reveals nothing about his perceptions or ideas or the knowledge he has derived from
them. Incrimination as to the fact of cognition, or the facility or mental dexterity with which one
engages in cognition, is instead analogous to blood tests. The privilege does not protect the fact
or quality of cognition, but only those substantive results that would tend to incriminate the
author. Only if Muniz had answered the question, and the content of that answer was somehow
incriminating, would the privilege have applied.
However, the Court did not hold that the sixth birthday question violated the Fifth
Amendment. That position only received four votes; Justice Marshall’s concurrence should be
understood as considering only whether the question violated Miranda, which has a broader
scope than the actual Fifth Amendment protection.153 To be sure, the Muniz Court came close to
making a mistake, but did not. As cases get close to any line, it is not surprising to see opinions
splinter; that is what we suggest occurred in Muniz. We also predict the line will not be breached
in the future. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Muniz is inconsistent with the Court’s
previous, and later, holdings. Never before or since has the Court held that a physical or
psychological process deserves protection independent of its substantive results.
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II.

The Remaining Ambiguities: A Threshold for Cognition and the Extent of
Derivative Use
As the previous section demonstrated, notwithstanding all the hand wringing over the

chaotic state of Fifth Amendment theory, the cases are quite consistent and explained by a fairly
simple theory. Three years ago, however, the Court handed down what appeared to be a highly
technical result, but which in fact had explosive potential—so explosive that if developed it
could essentially mean the end of subpoenas to targets of criminal investigations. The case was
United States v. Hubbell.154 Interestingly, what makes Hubbell so potentially significant is the
possibility that it embraces precisely the theory we have laid out in this article, and carries it to
its logical extension by bringing all derivative evidence within its scope. The Court’s opinion
was in the vocabulary of traditional Fifth Amendment case law, and the case purported to be
nothing more than an application of Fisher’s act of production doctrine.155 The Court essentially
held, however, that anything produced from compelled cognition that itself was protected, would
be immunized under the Fifth Amendment. This seems to reverse Fisher’s conclusion that, at
least in the context of subpoenas, the compelled cognition, but not its fruits, is immunized.156
We say “seems” because there is an alternative explanation that may explain the two cases:
154
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perhaps the Court will conceive of cognition, like compulsion and incrimination, as a variable
with a threshold that must be passed before the Fifth Amendment is violated. These are the
remaining sources of ambiguity. We elaborate on them in this section, and explain how they
arose. In the next section, we present the Court’s options and predict what it is likely to do.
In the act of production cases, the Court has flirted with various ways of limiting the
reach of “testimony,” but never has arrived at a satisfactory answer or comprehensible
explanation. Professor Cole lamented that in Fisher and the later act of production doctrine
cases, the Court “declined to articulate a test of general application that the lower courts could
use to assess the testimonial value of the act of producing documents.”157 This is because a
consistent “testimonial communications” test cannot be articulated given the Court’s
understanding of the term. By contrast, with cognition as the test, a threshold excluding some
cases from protection can be set. In the following elaboration of these points, we first we
explicate the crooked path from Fisher to Hubbell and its significance for the reach of the Fifth
Amendment. In the remainder of the section, we show how cognition is the key to understanding
the progression.
In United States v. Fisher, the Court addressed whether a summons demanding
production of documents created by an accountant for a taxpayer could be resisted on Fifth
Amendment grounds.158 The Court found that the content of subpoenaed documents was not
protected but that “[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has
communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced.”159
“Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes” the existence, possession or control, and
157
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authenticity of the documents delivered.160 The Court held, however, that compliance with the
summons in the case at hand “would involve no incriminating testimony within the protection of
the Fifth Amendment.”161
In reaching this conclusion, the Court revealed its concern about the possible
expansiveness of the act of production doctrine.162 Without providing a satisfactory explanation
for its conclusion, the Court embraced a constricted act of production doctrine, mentioning two
aspects of the case that presumably affected the outcome. First, compliance with the subpoena
was not “testimony” because the papers were not the defendant’s “private papers” but rather had
been created by an accountant. This fact is meant to distinguish Fisher from Boyd v. United
States.163 In Boyd, the Court announced a very broad privilege for individuals’ “private books
and papers.”164 Since the Boyd Court included within this protection a subpoenaed business
invoice, this is hardly a persuasive distinction.165 In fact, Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated dismissively that “[s]everal of Boyd’s express or implicit declarations have not stood the
test of time.”166 Justice O’Connor and others have since stated that Fisher “sounded the deathknell for Boyd.”167 The holding in Fisher narrowed the scope of the privilege dramatically from
what essentially had been a broad “zone of privacy” recognized in Boyd.168
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The second factor affecting Fisher’s outcome, according to the Court, was that the
“existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or
nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers.”169 This also effectively limited the scope of “testimony,” and thus of the reach of the
Fifth Amendment, but it left unclear what precisely would be protected.170 Were these necessary
or sufficient conditions? If the former, how did they interact? If the latter, what was the scope
of the “foregone conclusion” rationale? Indeed, commentators thought that perhaps the real
point of Fisher was to bring an end to the Boyd era, and not simply to extend it through a
different vocabulary.171
In United States v. Doe (Doe I), the Court for the first time, and to the surprise of many,
upheld the invocation of the privilege based on the act of production doctrine, thus indicating
that the reports of Boyd’s demise were greatly exaggerated.172 The owner of several sole
proprietorships received subpoenas requiring production of many categories of business
documents.173 The owner’s motion to quash was granted by the District Court upon a finding
“that the act of production would compel respondent to “admit that the records exist, that they
are in his possession, and that they are authentic.”174 The Supreme Court deferred to the lower
court’s “determination of factual issues” and affirmed the granting of the motion.175
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The Court’s decisions in the years following Doe I gave a curious gloss to the act of
production doctrine. They emphasized that “in order to be ‘testimonial,’ an accused’s oral or
written communication, or act, must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information.”176 Yet, in two cases where clearly incriminating communications were at
issue, the Court seemed to find the privilege inapplicable. In Braswell v. United States, the Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no
act of production privilege under the fifth amendment regarding corporate documents” and thus
“may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.”177 The Court
distinguished Doe I:
Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole proprietorship, Doe would require
that he be provided the opportunity to show that his act of production would entail
testimonial self-incrimination. But petitioner has operated his business through
the corporate form, and we have long recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently from
individuals. This doctrine—known as the collective entity rule—has a lengthy
and distinguished pedigree.178
The petitioner in Braswell was the sole shareholder of his two companies and he, his wife, and
his mother, were the only directors.179 His wife and mother held the positions of secretarytreasurer and vice-president of the corporations, respectively, and “neither ha[d] any authority
over the business affairs of either corporation.”180 Thus, the Court seems to say that a person
may not invoke the privilege, even if the production would be “personally incriminating,” if he
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has chosen one corporate form over another.181 This disturbingly formalistic approach led the
dissent to criticize the majority for being “captive to its own fictions.”182
Braswell was another unpersuasive effort to limit the privilege as, ironically, the majority
itself seemed to admit. Despite the unequivocal statement that the act of production would
afford corporate custodians no Fifth Amendment protection, the Court undid its entire opinion in
a last qualifying paragraph:
Although a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground
that his act of production will be personally incriminating, we do think certain
consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s act of production is one in
his representative rather than personal capacity. Because the custodian acts as a
representative, the act is deemed one of the corporation and not the individual.
Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it may make no evidentiary
use of the “individual act” against the individual. For example, in a criminal
prosecution against the custodian, the Government may not introduce into
evidence before the jury the fact that the subpoena was served upon and the
corporation’s documents were delivered by one particular individual, the
custodian.183
This amounts to an implicit grant of use immunity: in a criminal trial, the custodian’s act of
production cannot be used against him personally. If the privilege applies, why did the Court
state that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no act of production privilege
under the fifth amendment”?184 As Justice Kennedy commented, “[t]his exercise admits what
the Court denied in the first place, namely, that compelled compliance with the subpoena
implicates the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.”185
The Court revealed this same uncertainty about applying the act of production doctrine in
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.186 After holding that a mother may
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not invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist a court order to produce her child whom authorities
feared had been abused and possibly killed, the Court again ended its opinion with a cryptic
qualification:
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the
State’s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight’s act of production in
subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations
is not foreclosed. The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the
production order may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and
indirect use of that testimony.187
As in Braswell, the Court concluded that the State was not required to grant immunity ex
ante but implied that it might do so ex post.188 The state of the law thus was left unclear. First,
the cases may have produced a judicially-created form of immunity, not constrained by statute,
which can be recognized ex post by judges evaluating a prosecutor’s proposed use of the
evidence. It seems unlikely that this was the Court’s intent, however, given that in its earlier
decision in Doe I, it declined to adopt a “doctrine of constructive immunity” under which “the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of
the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.”189
Alternatively, perhaps the Court was trying in Bouknight and Braswell to be faithful to
the very narrow act of production doctrine of Fisher, but stumbled because of the lack of a clear
understanding of the nature of the very distinctions the Court was attempting to draw. Through
our theory—that the government may not compel revelation of the incriminating substantive
results of compelled cognition—the debate underlying these cases can be better understood. In
both Bouknight and Braswell the government sought to compel production of evidence through a
187
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court order. To compel such a response is to compel cognition by forcing the recipient of the
subpoena/order to read the subpoena, compare its language with his own knowledge, and arrive
at substantive answers as to which documents or physical items satisfy the terms of the order.
The government would then compel revelation of the presumably incriminating results of this
compelled cognition. The only remaining questions are whether the level of cognition meets
some threshold, and what the derivative consequences will be.
Some scholars have suggested that the scope of the Fifth Amendment should be confined
to explicit “testimonial use” and have little or no derivative consequences. Professor Arenella
explained that a violation would only occur, or conversely immunity should only be granted,
where the government seeks to make “testimonial use” of an actor’s “thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs.”190 Similarly, Amar and Lettow suggested an approach limiting what is presented at
trial:
[T]he Court should move beyond the way station of Kastigar and declare that a
person’s (perhaps unreliable) compelled pretrial statements can never be
introduced against him in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements
virtually always can be. Thus, the government should be allowed to require a
suspect to answer relevant questions in a civilized pretrial hearing presided over
by a judge or magistrate. Under penalty of contempt, a suspect must answer
truthfully, but he will be entitled to ‘testimonial immunity’: that is, the compelled
words will never be introduced over the defendant’s objection in a criminal trial –
the defendant will never be an involuntary ‘witness’ against himself ‘in’ a
‘criminal case’ – but the fruits of these compelled pretrial words will generally be
admissible.191
Amar and Lettow declared that the Court was “leaning” in this direction.192 The Supreme
Court’s conclusion in United States v. Hubbell, in an opinion with potentially astonishing
implications, is to the contrary.193
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Webster Hubbell pleaded guilty to tax evasion and mail fraud in 1994 and promised, as
part of his plea agreement, to provide the Independent Counsel with “full, complete, accurate,
and truthful information” about the investigation into the Whitewater Development
Corporation.194 While Hubbell was serving his twenty-one-month sentence, the Independent
Counsel tried to determine whether the agreement to provide information had been violated by
serving Hubbell with a subpoena duces tecum calling for eleven categories of documents.195
Hubbell appeared before an Arkansas grand jury but invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.196
The prosecutor presented a § 6003 order from the District Court, granting Hubbell immunity “to
the extent allowed by law” and ordering him to respond to the subpoena.197 Hubbell produced
13,120 pages of documents and asserted, “those were all of the documents in his custody or
control that were responsive to the commands in the subpoena . . . .”198
In 1998, a new grand jury returned an indictment for tax-related crimes as well as mail
and wire fraud.199 Though the contents of the documents produced by Hubbell “provided the
Independent Counsel with the information that led to this second prosecution, the government
asserted that in the criminal case against Hubbell “it would not have to advert to [Hubbell’s] act
of production in order to prove the existence, authenticity, or custody” or to even “introduce any
of the documents” into evidence.200 The question before the Court was whether Hubbell’s “act
of production immunity” would pose a “significant bar” to prosecution.201 Since “the scope of
‘use and derivate-use’ immunity that [§ 6002] provides is coextensive with the scope of the
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constitutional privilege,” the real issue was the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.202 The
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the indictment.203
The Court found that the prosecution was barred from producing at trial Hubbell’s
response to the subpoena or the fact of his having produced the evidence.204 “That would surely
be a prohibited ‘use’ of the immunized act of production.”205 The Court went further, however,
and found it “clear” that the government had “already made ‘derivative use’ of the testimonial
aspect of that act in obtaining the indictment against the respondent and in preparing its case for
trial.”206 “[I]t is undeniable,” the Court wrote, “that providing a catalog of existing documents
fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with
a ‘lead to incriminating evidence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.’”207
Although the Court asserted, as it had in prior cases, that the contents of the documents were not
privileged,208 the contents themselves did provide the link. “The contents of the documents
produced by respondent provided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to this
second prosecution.”209
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed the nature of Hubbell’s actions in
responding to the subpoena.210 It observed:
It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of “the
contents of his own mind” in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to
the requests in the subpoena. The assembly of those documents was like telling
an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the
key to a strongbox. The Government’s anemic view of respondent’s act of
production as a mere physical act that is principally nontestimonial in character
202
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and can be entirely divorced from its “implicit” testimonial aspect so as to
constitute a “legitimate, wholly independent source” (as required by Kastigar) for
the documents produced simply fails to account for these realities.211
In other words, the Court concluded that the government had, through its issuance of a subpoena,
caused cognition when the recipient read the subpoena, compared its language with his own
knowledge, and arrived at substantive answers as to which documents satisfied the terms of the
subpoena.

The government then compelled the disclosure of the incriminating substantive

results of this compelled cognition through a grant of immunity.
The dramatic change from Fisher to Hubbell is clear. Fisher suggested a high threshold
for cognition and a limited derivative use doctrine. A substantial use of knowledge would be
required before the privilege would apply, and the scope of immunity would be limited to the
bare act of production. The privilege’s applicability to interrogations and confessions was
unaffected because these cases necessarily involve significant use of knowledge and could
themselves be used substantively at trial.

Where the individual only had to respond

mechanically to an order, as in Fisher, the response to subpoenas was either below the minimal
threshold for cognition, evidentially irrelevant, or some combination of the two. The Court in
Fisher implied that there might be a situation in which the act of production would involve
sufficient cognition so that the threshold would be met, although it also suggested that this would
not be common. Thus in Fisher, although the subject of the subpoena had to read, understand,
and respond to the contents of the subpoena—all of which require cognition as we use the
term—the Court concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment protection for the act of
production itself, and consequently, not for the contents of the disclosed documents. Following
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Fisher, then, cognition appeared to be a variable that must rise above a certain threshold, and the
scope of permissible derivative use, while unclear, seemed somwhat constricted.
In Hubbell, the Court took a dramatic step in concluding that no derivative use at all
could be made of the incriminating substantive results of Hubbell’s cognition. The attachment of
derivative use to the “testimony” component significantly expanded the potential scope of
protection, suggesting that the two cases are in direct tension with each other. Justices Thomas
and Scalia, concurring in Hubbell, expressed a willingness to reconsider Fisher,212 but the
majority made a half-hearted effort to distinguish the case.213 In Fisher, the Court explained, the
“existence and location of the papers” was a “foregone conclusion.”214 Without doing much to
explain their rationale, the Court simply stated that it did not apply to Hubbell’s situation.215
If we look to the subpoenas at issue in these cases, we find no support for a categorical
distinction. In Fisher, the Court considered appeals in two cases from two Circuits. In United
States v. Kasmir, the subpoena considered by the Fifth Circuit ordered production of:
1. Accountant’s work papers pertaining to Dr. Mason’s books and records of
1969, 1970, and 1971.
2. Retained copies of Dr. Mason’s income tax returns for 1969, 1970, and 1971.
3. Retained copies of reports and other correspondence between (the accounting
firm) and Dr. Mason during 1969, 1970, and 1971. 216
In United States v. Fisher, the subpoena considered by the Third Circuit required the recipient:
‘to give testimony relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability’
of Morris Goldsmith and to bring with him, among other things, an ‘Analysis of
Receipts and Disbursements for Morris Goldsmith for 1969 and 1970’ and an
‘Analysis of the Receipts and Disbursements of Sally Goldsmith for 1969 and
1970.’217
212

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“None of the parties in this case has asked us to depart from
Fisher, but in light of the historical evidence that the Self-Incrimination Clause may have a broader reach than
Fisher holds, I remain open to a reconsideration of that decision and its progeny in a proper case.”)
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The Hubbell subpoena demanded documents in several areas including:
C. Copies of all bank records of Webster Hubbell, his wife, or children for all
accounts from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not limited to all
statements, registers and ledgers, cancelled checks, deposit items, and wire
transfers.
D. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to time worked or
billed by Webster Hubbell from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not
limited to original time sheets, books, notes, papers, and/or computer records.218
All three of these subpoenas required cognition. There may be differences in the quantity of
documents to be produced and the length of time needed to gather them. Yet, each subpoena
recipient will be required to determine which documents fit the description of the subpoena. In
Kasmir, the prosecutor presumably knew that there were “accountant’s work papers” and that
they were likely in the accountant’s possession. Still, there was no “foregone conclusion” about
any particular document. The Hubbell subpoena is similar, differing only by degree.
Commentators have given much weight to the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, arguing
that it creates a useful dichotomy.219 Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing Fisher from
Hubbell, Cole wrote, “the difference between the two cases, if any, arises out of the application
of the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine.”220 Although disappointed that the Court had “declined to
provide a definitive answer,” Cole concluded that “[b]y recognizing the extent of the
Government’s prior knowledge as the critical inquiry for purposes of the application of the
foregone conclusion doctrine, the Court effectively resolved the issue of when the doctrine
should apply.”221 Proceeding to lay out the “analytical framework mandated by Hubbell,” Cole
218
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presented a three-part test.222

The second and third phases inquire into the presence of

incrimination and compulsion, respectively.223 “Phase One” of the inquiry asks “whether the act
of production has sufficient testimonial value to be protected by the Fifth Amendment, or stated
differently, whether the testimonial information that would be conveyed is a ‘foregone
conclusion’ because the government has ‘prior knowledge’ of that information.”224

In the

context of document production, Cole equated the “testimonial” component with “prior
knowledge” by the government.
Robert Mosteller, also concluded that the foregone conclusion doctrine is at the center of
the analysis.225 Mosteller interpreted Hubbell as holding that “when the prosecution does not
have specific information about the existence of incriminating documents, demanding them
violates the Fifth Amendment.”226

He concluded that “[n]ow the important battle is the

determination of the extent of prosecutorial knowledge necessary to establish that the existence
of the documents is a ‘foregone conclusion.’”227 He joined this battle and presented a complex
hypothesis of how the foregone conclusion doctrine can work in practice.228
The “foregone conclusion” doctrine almost surely cannot sustain this weight. First, it is
hard to read the Court’s opinion as providing much support. The Court never suggests that its
holding is based on a foregone conclusion analysis, its only reference to it being the half-hearted
and rather dismissive comment that, “[w]hatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’
rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it.”229 More importantly, the argument

222

Id. at 184.
Id. at 186-88.
224
Id. at 184.
225
See Mosteller, supra note xx, at 508-510.
226
Id. at 492.
227
Id. at 518.
228
See also Wedeles, supra note xx, at 625-26 (also proclaiming the importance of the “foregone conclusion”
doctrine).
229
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44.
223

51
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

leads to unacceptable results. If the information sought is evidentially important, then it cannot
matter how much the government already knows.230 Under Mosteller’s and Cole’s analysis, the
government could presumably compel oral confessions if it had other evidence of what the
defendant knew or would say. In John Doe’s polygraph case, there would be no violation if the
government already had the little girl’s body and substantial evidence of Doe’s guilt, but merely
wanted to solidify the case against him.
By contrast, the foregone conclusion doctrine makes more sense if it is understood as
directed toward the witness’s cognitive efforts rather than the government’s knowledge.231 The
doctrine does not define a difference in kind between types of subpoenas; rather, it highlights
that cognitive demands may vary between different subpoenas. A subpoena that demands
production of a very specific document kept in a very specific location requires very little mental
effort. The individual must only compare the language of the request to his own knowledge of
the document sought. A more vague or broad-reaching subpoena requires greater cognitive
effort. The individual must interpret the meaning of the request, sort though large numbers of
documents, and try to determine if a variety of documents can all fit within the parameters of a
request. If the foregone conclusion doctrine is to have any importance following Hubbell, we
suggest that it is this.

230

Anticipating this argument, Justice Brennan commented that “I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which
makes the testimonial nature of evidence, and therefore, one’s protection against incriminating himself, turn on the
strength of the Government’s case against him.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 429 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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If the doctrine is understood in terms of the government’s knowledge, then it may be more appropriate under a
Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis. Though the scholars relying on the foregone conclusion doctrine have
not stated it explicitly, their reliance on a government-oriented doctrine may suggest that they believe Hubbell is
really a Fourth Amendment case rather than a Fifth Amendment one. The problem with such a position, however, is
that it contradicts the explicit analysis of the Supreme Court. It may be fair for scholars to argue that the Court
should analyze document subpoenas under the Fourth Amendment, but it is not accurate to say that this is how the
Court has analyzed them. In other words, a foregone conclusion doctrine based on the government’s knowledge
may be offered within a normative, but not a positive, theory.
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III.

The Future
How Fisher and Hubbell relate—and thus the future of the Fifth Amendment—is unclear

on two fronts. First, is cognition a variable like compulsion and incrimination? In what may
prove to be the single most important word in the opinion, the Court referred to the “extensive”
effort that Hubbell had to make to respond to the subpoena.232 Perhaps less extensive efforts will
not meet the required threshold, and the location of the breaking point will be determined
through a common-law process. The second issue is the scope of derivative immunity—how far
will the causal consequences of cognition extend? These two issues may be dependent or
independent. The extensiveness of cognitive effort may result in a more extensive derivative use
protection, or the permissible derivative use may remain constant so long as the threshold of
cognition is met. These two variables point the way to the future.
There are three possible directions in which the law can evolve. First, the Court may
choose to follow Fisher for both inquiries. This would permit derivative use and limit the
privilege to situations where the bare act of production is itself incriminating. Second, the Court
may follow Hubbell in both respects. This would create a restrictive derivative use doctrine and
extend the privilege to all cases where the substantive contents of cognition is compelled. Third,
the Court might embrace the derivative use aspect of Hubbell and couple it with a requirement of
“extensive” cognition. Doing so would raise the related question of the relationship between the
two variables—as the extent of the compelled substantive cognition increases, does the scope of
protection for the derivative consequences increase as well?
The practical consequences of these different choices are obvious. If the Court embraces
Fisher, and comes to view Hubbell as an aberration, the privilege will be substantially curtailed
232
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with regard to subpoenas. A reductionist view of the act of production doctrine and the nature of
a compelled act would result. All complexities and conditions would be obscured or ignored so
that a bare act would seem to carry no significance. The context of the compelled disclosure
would be shielded from view so that the government could act as though it obtained the evidence
through its own independent efforts. Following the Fisher approach, no preexisting documents
would be protected. The government would only be limited in the way that it could describe to a
trier of fact how it came into possession of the documents. The government could use compelled
evidence if it were treated as though it arrived like “manna from heaven,” “by assuming that it
miraculously appeared in the district attorney’s office.”233 The Fifth Amendment would be
orderly and curtailed. Where compulsion or incrimination is missing or below the required
threshold, there would be no privilege. Only where there is compulsion, incrimination, and a
high level of cognition, such as in John Doe’s polygraph case, would the privilege apply. At the
low end of the cognition scale, in the context of subpoenas for example, the privilege would not
apply. The government would continue to be able to use subpoenas to compel incriminating
evidence. The substance of the evidence, such as the contents of the documents or the condition
of the child in Bouknight, would not be protected.
If Hubbell dominates the future, every response to a subpoena will involve sufficient
cognition to implicate the privilege and derivative use protection will be extensive. The scope of
the Fifth Amendment would become so large that it would swallow subpoenas.

Uviller

recognized with dismay that Hubbell’s derivative protection “comes perilously close to treating
the contents of a document as the indirect product of its production.”234 As the Court stated in
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Hubbell, it was the “contents of the documents produced by respondent” that “provided the
Independent Counsel with the information that led to his second prosecution.”235 But this means
that no subpoena can be enforced over a Fifth Amendment objection without a grant of
immunity. The grant of immunity in turn would make it next to impossible to prosecute the
subject of a subpoena.236
If the Court chooses to follow the Hubbell approach, we can still expect it to decide cases
in a relatively orderly fashion. As under Fisher, there would be no privilege where either
compulsion or incrimination was missing. The polygraph and psychological examination cases
will also be decided the same under both approaches—the privilege will apply because a
sufficient level of cognition is involved. The privilege will not be applicable in exemplar cases
under either approach as long as the plurality decision in Muniz on the sixth birthday question is
wrong. If Hubbell and the plurality in Muniz are both right, then all aspects of incriminating
forced reasoning will constitute violations of the Fifth Amendment. If Hubbell is right and the
documents. The process of recognition and the implicit voucher of authenticity—attesting, in effect, that these are
the items answering the description in the subpoena—are, of course, the predicates of Fisher. But Fisher precludes
only the use of the inculpatory inference itself (here displaced by the immunity). The facilitation of understanding
from an organized catalogue, like the discovery of the substantive crimes from the facts recorded in the documents,
is not really a secondary gain from the compelled act of production; it is simply drawing inferences from contents.
It hardly seems “anemic” to argue that Fisher forbids the use of inferences from the “physical act” of production
only, and not from the contents of the items produced.”).
235
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31.
236
See United States v. Oliver North, 910 F.2d 823, 872-73, as amended, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). In North, the D.C. Circuit described the burdensome procedure for determining
whether a prosecution had been tainted by the use of immunized testimony:
[T]he District Court must hold a full Kastigar hearing that will inquire into the content as well as
the sources of the grand jury and trial witnesses’ testimony. That inquiry must proceed witnessby-witness; if necessary, it will proceed line-by-line and item-by-item. For each grand jury and
trial witness, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of the evidence that no use
whatsoever was made of any of the immunized testimony either by the witness or by the Office of
Independent Counsel in questioning the witness. This burden may be met by establishing that the
witness was never exposed to North’s immunized testimony, or that the allegedly tainted
testimony contains no evidence not “canned” by the prosecution before such exposure occurred.
Unless the District Court can make express findings that the government has carried this heavy
burden as to the content of all of the testimony of each witness, that testimony cannot survive the
Kastigar test. We remind the prosecution that the Kastigar burden is “heavy” not because of the
evidentiary standard, but because of the constitutional standard: the government has to meet its
proof only by a preponderance of the evidence, but any failure to meet that standard must result in
exclusion of the testimony. Id. at 872-73.
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plurality in Muniz is wrong, then the Fifth Amendment will apply to every subpoena that
demands information that incriminates the recipient. The quality of the recipient’s reasoning, or
his mental or intellectual aptitude, will not be protected and the privilege will remain concerned
only with disclosure of the substantive results of cognition.
The third possibility is that neither Fisher nor Hubbell sets the right threshold for
cognition. Hubbell locates the threshold much lower on the continuum than does Fisher.237
There is broad range of possibilities between the two extremes and the Court may try to choose a
spot somewhere in the middle. Perhaps the future will turn on Justice Stevens’ comment that
“[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his
own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the
subpoena.”238

It may be that the entire impact of Hubbell will be contained in the word

“extensive.” Future cases would have to search for the meaning of this term, looking for a
location for the threshold. As an inherently relative term, “extensive” can never be given a clear
definition. It would require courts to continuously analogize and distinguish the facts of future
cases, gradually limiting the possibilities for the variable. The remaining question would then be
whether the extent of cognition relates to the extensiveness of derivative use protection. The
answer to that question would in turn determine whether subpoenas could ever issue for targets
of investigations.
How will the Court choose between these possibilities? Almost certainly it will do so in
light of the “felt necessities of the times.”239 A broad reading of Hubbell coupled with a robust
derivative use doctrine will increase the protections of the Fifth Amendment but also the costs of
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investigations, and vice versa. We thus predict that the Court will see cognition and derivative
use as variables that interact. As the government makes more cognitive demands on the subject
of a subpoena, the probability will increase that the act of production is compelled “testimony”
and that the derivative fruits are protected. This will mean that a new common-law line of cases
will have to be developed. This will have its own costs, including the lack of a clear a priori
rule. Nonetheless, if what we predict comes to pass, it will have the effect—and some might say
the virtue—of capturing the notion that the protection of the citizen increases as the government
makes greater demands. If there is a normative justification for the positive theory we have
developed here, using the terms as conventionally used in legal scholarship, we suspect that this
is it.
We do not make much of this justification, however. To return to where this article
began, we doubt that the normal meaning of “normative justification” is a very useful one in any
field of law with the range of the fifth amendment, that it is quite similar to the fourth
amendment in this regard,240 and that scholarly efforts to discover its “true” justification are
doomed to failure. This does not mean that fields of law are unjustified, but instead that the
justification must come in other terms. The terms plainly applicable to these two areas are the
traditional ones of the rule of law. The Court has strived to make sense of ambiguous directives
through creating and sustaining relatively clear legal categories and by responding to new
situations through analogies to prior cases. We think it plausible that, however dull this may
appear to the legal theorist, the legal system may be better off as a result.
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